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Abstract
In the first part of this two-part article (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014), we have intro-
duced and analyzed a multidimensional model, called the general tension-reduction (GTR)
model, able to describe general quantum-like measurements with an arbitrary number of
outcomes, and we have used it as a general theoretical framework to study the most general
possible condition of lack of knowledge in a measurement, so defining what we have called
a universal measurement. In this second part, we present the formal proof that universal
measurements, which are averages over all possible forms of fluctuations, produce the same
probabilities as measurements characterized by uniform fluctuations on the measurement sit-
uation. Since quantum probabilities can be shown to arise from the presence of such uniform
fluctuations, we have proven that they can be interpreted as the probabilities of a first-order
non-classical theory, describing situations in which the experimenter lacks complete knowl-
edge about the nature of the interaction between the measuring apparatus and the entity
under investigation. This same explanation can be applied – mutatis mutandis – to the case
of cognitive measurements, made by human subjects on conceptual entities, or in decision
processes, although it is not necessarily the case that the structure of the set of states would
be in this case strictly Hilbertian. We also show that universal measurements correspond to
maximally robust descriptions of indeterministic reproducible experiments, and since quan-
tum measurements can also be shown to be maximally robust, this adds plausibility to their
interpretation as universal measurements, and provides a further element of explanation for
the great success of the quantum statistics in the description of a large class of phenomena.
Keywords: Quantum probability, quantum modeling, universal measurement, entanglement,
context, emergence, human thought, human decision, concept combination, robustness
1 Introduction
This is the second part of a two-part article, aimed at the investigation of a very general class of
measurements, relevant to experiments performed both in cognitive science and physics. Although
the present article is written in a self-consistent way, and therefore can be read independently of the
content of its first part (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014), the lecture of the latter is recommended.
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We also refer the reader to the first article for a general discussion of the relevance of quantum
structures in the macro world, and in particular in the field of psychology and cognitive science,
referred to meanwhile commonly as ‘quantum cognition’ (Aerts & Aerts, 1995; Aerts et al., 2013;
Aerts & Gabora, 2005a,b; Aerts, Gabora & Sozzo, 2013; Blutner, 2009; Blutner, Pothos & Bruza,
2013; Bruza, Busemeyer & Gabora, 2009; Bruza et al., 2007, 2008a,b, 2009a,b; Busemeyer &
Bruza, 2012; Busemeyer et al., 2011; Busemeyer, Wang & Townsend, 2006; Franco, 2009; Haven
& Khrennikov, 2013; Gabora & Aerts, 2002; Khrennikov, 2010; Khrennikov & Haven, 2009; Pothos
& Busemeyer, 2009; Van Rijsbergen, 2004; Wang et al., 2013; Yukalov & Sornette, 2010).
In Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi (2014), we have initially introduced and analyzed a model,
that we have called the uniform tension-reduction (UTR) model, allowing to represent probabil-
ities associated with all possible one-measurement situations, and we have used it to explain the
emergence of quantum probabilities (the Born rule) as uniform fluctuations on the measurement
situation. The particularity of the UTR-model is to exploit the geometry of simplexes to represent
the states both of the measured and measuring entities, in a way that the outcome probabilities
can be derived as the (uniform) Lebesgue measure of suitably defined convex subregions of the
simplex under consideration.
In Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi (2014), we have also shown that, although the UTR-model is
an abstract construct, it admits physical realizations, and we have proposed a very simple and
evocative one, using a material point particle which is acted upon by special elastic membranes,
which by breaking and collapsing are able to produce the different possible outcomes. This easy to
visualize mechanical realization allowed us to gain considerable insight into the hidden structure of
a measurement process, be it that associated with a cognitive measurement, on a conceptual entity
(or in the ambit of a decision process), or a physics measurement, on a microscopic entity. For
instance, thanks to it, it becomes possible to visualize the structural difference between measure-
ments performed on entangled entities (combinations of concepts, of elementary “particles,” etc.),
as opposed to measurements performed on separate entities, in terms of a dimensional change
in the measurement context, whose increased level of potentiality requires higher dimensional
membranes to be described.
Always in the first part of this two-part article, we have considered a further generalization
of the UTR-model, by considering conditions of lack of knowledge which can be associated with
non-uniform fluctuations, in what we have called the general tension-reduction (GTR) model.
In this more general theoretical framework, we have introduced and motivated a notion of uni-
versal measurement, which describes the most general possible condition of lack of knowledge
in a measurement, and we have pointed out that the uniform fluctuations characterizing quan-
tum measurements can also be understood as an average over all possible forms of non-uniform
fluctuations, which can in principle be actualized in a measurement context.
The main purpose of this second part of the article is to present the formal proof of the theo-
rem establishing the correspondence between universal measurements and uniform measurements.
Since the quantum mechanical Born rule can be described in terms of uniform fluctuations, it fol-
lows from this result that quantum measurements can be interpreted as universal measurements,
i.e., as measurements describing situations which are uniform mixtures of different possible mea-
surement situations, thus defining a condition of lack of knowledge not only about the interaction
which is each time actualized, between the measured entity and the measured system, but also
about the way such interaction is chosen, among all the possible ways of choosing it. Of course,
this doesn’t mean that quantum measurements, performed on microscopic entities like electrons,
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neutrons, protons, etc., would necessarily be universal measurements. For the time being, this
remains an open question. What we know, however, is that the huge average involved in a univer-
sal measurement is perfectly compatible with this interpretation. Hence, we have proven that the
hypothesis that a quantum measurement is a universal measurement can be true, and hence, since
the way in which probability arises and is intrinsic in a universal measurement can be understood
intuitively and completely, in case this hypothesis is true, it entails a deep explanation of the
nature of a quantum measurement.
For cognitive measurements the situation is different. Indeed, a typical experiment in cognitive
science usually involves different human subjects who, because of the specificities and uniqueness
of their mind structures, will necessarily have different ways of choosing the possible answers to the
questions that are addressed to them, or will have different ways of deciding when facing situations
requiring a decision process. Therefore, their actions will be in principle characterized by different
sets of probabilities for the different outcomes. In other terms, if we consider the ensemble of
the participants in a given experiment, we can say that the overall statistics of outcomes they
deliver is the result of an average over different kinds of measurements. This not only because
each subject would choose/decide according to different criteria, but also because even a same
subject can choose according to different criteria in two different moments. This means that
a model where the probabilities associated with the different possible outcomes, obtained from
the answers collected from the different subjects, are considered as averages over the different
probabilities associated with the different measurements performed by each of them, is a model
that corresponds well to the situation we imagine to occur.
So, in cognitive science, if we want to be adherent to what can readily be supposed to actu-
ally happen during an experiment, modelizing a measurement situation in the form of a meta-
measurement, i.e., in a way that the statistics of outcomes results from a process of randomiza-
tion over different individual measurements, is a plausible approach. This is precisely what the
GTR-model allows to do, describing the different possible measurements by means of different
probability densities ρ, which are subsequently averaged out in what we have called a universal
measurement.
Considering the above, it is clear that the result of the equivalence between universal measure-
ments and uniform measurements acquires a different meaning in quantum physics and cognitive
science. In quantum physics it has more the value of an explanation of the nature of quantum
probabilities. It suggests that the level of potentiality inherent in a microphysical quantum process
is possibly much deeper than it was initially hypothesized in the so-called hidden measurement
approach (Aerts, 1986, 1998, 1999b; Coecke, 1995; Sassoli de Bianchi, 2013), as it would concern
not only the process of actualization of single measurement interactions, but of entire ways of
choosing these interactions.
For the cognitive ambit, it predicts the existence of a ‘first order theory,’ which may be equal to
the orthodox quantum theory, but can also be different from it, but can in any case be formulated
using a uniform probability density ρu, in what we have called the UTR-model. This possible
difference between orthodox quantum mechanics and the ‘first order theory’ describing cognitive
measurements, would manifest at the level of the structure of the set of states of the conceptual
entities,1 which is not necessarily Hilbertian. If it will turn out to be Hilbertian, as apparently
1We recall that it is possible to formalize a concept as an entity in a specific state, and a context as a “surround-
ing” which is able to produce a change (either deterministic or indeterministic) of such state (Aerts & Gabora,
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is the case for the microphysical entities,2 then cognitive measurements, understood as universal
measurements, will also turn out to be equivalent to quantum measurements, in the sense that not
only the probabilities of single measurements, but also of sequential and conditional measurements,
will produce the same values as those predicted by the Born rule. On the other hand, if it
will turn out not to be Hilbertian, considering however the effectiveness of so many quantum
models of cognition and decision (and the proof of the equivalence between universal and uniform
measurements presented in this article), we might nevertheless expect the theory behind such
models of cognition and decision to be quite close to quantum theory. Also because we already
know that cognitive measurements do reveal the presence of typical quantum effects of interference,
contextuality, entanglement and emergence (Aerts, 2009; Aerts et al., 2000; Aerts & Gabora,
2005a,b; Aerts & Sozzo, 2011; Gabora & Aerts, 2002), when concepts in different possible states
are combined and data of experiments with human subjects on such combinations of concepts are
modeled. But this of course does not mean that all these effects necessarily originate from a strict
Hilbertian structure for the set of states. For instance, as emphasized in Aerts & Sozzo (2012a,b),
one doesn’t need linearity to model entanglement.
It is worth emphasizing that to be able to identify what is the probability model which is behind
cognitive measurements (assuming that a single explanatory model can consistently describe all
possible data), one needs a sufficiently general theoretical framework to integrate and analyze not
only the existing data, but also, and more importantly, the data that will become available in
the future. Here it is important to distinguish ‘ad hoc mathematical models,’ constructed only
with the purpose of fitting data, from more ‘fundamental models,’ which try to identify, in a
more stringent way, the basic structure which is really behind the collected data, as well as its
possible significance. In physics, for instance, one usually speaks of ‘phenomenological models,’
which just organize mathematically the results of the observed phenomena without paying too
much attention to their possible significance, as opposed to more deep ‘explanatory models,’ which
2005a; Gabora & Aerts, 2002).
2The majority of physicists would generally agree that orthodox quantum theory does conveniently describe all
possible measurements on entities of the micro world, i.e., that the Hilbert space model, equipped with the Born
rule, is sufficient to capture the essence of the behavior of microscopic entities, when acted upon in the different
measurement contexts. But maybe this is something we should not take as fully granted. This because, as was
noted by one of us in the eighties, the theoretical construct of orthodox quantum physics presents some severe
structural shortcomings (Aerts, 1982, 1986, 1999a; Aerts & Durt, 1994; Aerts et al., 1997a, 1999b). For instance,
it cannot describe the situation where entities can become fully separated in experimental terms. However, the
possibility of pointing out, also at the microscopic level, the existence of separated entities, cannot be excluded.
As an example, consider the famous coincidence measurements conducted by Alain Aspect on entangled photons
(Aspect, 1999). These measurements are usually adjusted in a way as to only select pairs of entities that, as they fly
apart, remain connected, thus producing a violation of Bell’s inequalities. But experiments could also be adjusted
in a way that possible coincident but disconnected pairs could also be detected, not necessarily giving rise to
correlations. This possibility would describe regimes which are non-quantum, but quantum-like, and therefore not
describable by the Born rule. The problem is that this possibility is usually not investigated, as experimenters will
generally not consider adjustments of their measurements so as to allow for the possibility that entangled entities
could also disentangle during their fly, as this would in general be interpreted as a badly performed experiment.
However, these “wrong” adjustments, associated with “badly performed experiments,” could also in principle be
interpreted as adjustments that favor the selection of measurements which, if taken into consideration, would lead
to a statistics of outcomes different from that of Born. In other terms, we cannot totally exclude that in some of
our quantum measurements we are maybe filtering out some of the outcomes (unduly considering them as outliers),
and this could be the reason why we are not yet able to observe possible deviations from the Born statistics.
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instead try to understand the observed phenomena at a more fundamental level, possibly deriving
them from first principles.
The GTR-model, and the proposed notion of universal measurement, is precisely a first step
towards the construction of a more fundamental and explanatory model, able not only to phe-
nomenologically account for the different data, but also to possibly explain their origin. The
theorem that we prove in the present article, can be considered as an attempt of constructing
cognitive models starting also from first principles. Here the first principle we advocate is that a
cognitive measurement is essentially an averaged measurement (described in the GTR-model by
the different ρ characterizing the different ways of choosing the outcomes), and that if the average
involves a sufficiently large set of data, then a ‘first order theory’ will emerge, which is described by
a simpler structure in which probabilities are obtained in terms of the uniform Lebesgue measure
(the UTR-model).
It is worth mentioning that the GTR-model, contrary to the classical Kolmogorovian model,
has the advantage of also allowing for a representation of the states of the entity under consid-
eration (be it conceptual, or physical), as points in a simplex. Also the Hilbert-model, of course,
allows for a representation of the states, but it imposes them, from the start, a very specific
(Hilbertian) structure. In cognitive science, however, as we previously mentioned, we haven’t yet
determined what is the structure of the set of states. To determine that structure, one needs to
go beyond the analysis of single-measurement situations, and collect data from which also condi-
tional and/or sequential probabilities can be deduced. However, these data will not be analyzable
within the too limited structure of the Hilbert-model, but will require the more ample framework
of the UTR-model (which is not necessarily linear) or of the GTR-model (which is not necessarily
uniform).
Let us also mention another advantage of the GTR-model: the fact that, similarly to the
Hilbert-model, it contains a procedure for forming joint (possibly entangled) entities, by simply
multiplying the dimension of the real spaces describing the single entities (Aerts & Sassoli de
Bianchi, 2014), but, different from the Hilbert-model, it does so without the hypothesis of linear-
ity. This possibility is of course absent in classical Kolmogorovian models, which by the way are
also incapable of describing measurement processes which change the state of the measured entity
(which is the typical situation both in microphysics and cognitive sciences). All the above ad-
vantages will certainly prove to be instrumental in future works, aimed at clarifying the (possibly
non-Hilbertian) structure of the set of states of human conceptual entities.
In addition to the description of the GTR-model, and the proof of the equivalence between
universal and uniform measurements, we shall also discuss in this second part of the article the
important notion of ‘robustness of a measurement,’ showing that universal measurements corre-
spond to maximally robust indeterministic reproducible experiments. This characteristic being
also shared by quantum measurements, as evidenced in the recent analysis of De Raedt et al.
(2013), the result not only increases the plausibility that quantum measurements are also univer-
sal measurements, but provides a further explanation of their success in describing different fields
of investigations.
The work is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we present some basic elements of the quantum
formalism, to define notations and to allow to easily establish, in the subsequent sections, the
correspondence between quantum measurements and the measurement described in the GTR-
model, when the probability density ρ is uniform. In Sec. 3, we introduce the GTR-model and
recall that in the uniform case it becomes isomorphic to the Hilbert-model of quantum mechanics,
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when the states describing the entity under investigation come from a Hilbert space. Then, in
Sec. 4, we define the fundamental notion of universal measurement and enunciate the theorem
establishing the equivalence between universal and uniform measurements.
To prove the theorem, we proceed with the following steps. In Sec. 5, we discretize the
GTR-model and show that one can always consider limits of cellular probability densities to
approximate, with arbitrary precision, the probabilities obtained from arbitrary, non-cellular,
probability densities. This will allow us to consider, in Sec. 6, the average over all possible kinds
of measurements, focusing our analysis on discretized structures, proving in this way the theorem.
Finally, in Sec. 7, we study the notion of robustness, and show that universal measurements
are maximally robust, and in Sec. 8 we offer some conclusive remarks.
2 Quantum Probabilities for a Single Observable
In this section we present the basic formalism of quantum mechanics, in relation to the measure-
ment of a finite dimensional observable. Not to unnecessarily complicate the discussion, we shall
limit ourselves, throughout the article, to the situation of a non-degenerate measurement, associ-
ated with a non-degenerate observable. All the results we shall obtain can be easily generalized
to the degenerate case, proceeding as shown in (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014).
In orthodox quantum theory, the state of an entity (for a physicist it can be a microscopic
entity, like an neutron, for a cognitive scientist, a concept, or a situation apt for a decision process)
is described by a unit vector of a vector space over the field C of complex numbers – the so-called
Hilbert space H – equipped with a (sesquilinear) inner product 〈·|·〉, which maps two vectors |φ〉,
|ψ〉 to a complex number 〈φ|ψ〉, and consequently with a norm ‖|ψ〉‖ ≡ √〈ψ|ψ〉, which assigns
a positive length to each vector. In this paper we only consider Hilbert spaces having a finite
number of dimensions, and we denote HN a Hilbert space whose vectors are N -dimensional.
An observable is a measurable quantity of the entity under consideration, and in quantum
theory is represented by a self-adjoint operator A, acting on vectors of the Hilbert space, i.e.,
A : |ψ〉 → A|ψ〉. In our case, being the Hilbert space N -dimensional, A can be entirely described
by means of its N eigenvectors |ai〉 and the associated (real) eigenvalues ai, obeying the eigenvalue
relations A|ai〉 = ai|ai〉, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} ≡ IN . If the eigenvectors have been duly normalized,
so that in addition to the orthogonality relation 〈ai|aj〉 = δij, i, j ∈ IN , they also obey the
completeness relation
∑
i∈IN |ai〉〈ai| = I, where I denotes the unit operator, they can be used to
construct the orthogonal projections Pi ≡ |ai〉〈ai|, i ∈ IN , obeying
∑
i∈IN Pi = I, PiPj = Piδij,
i, j ∈ IN , which in turn can be used to write the observable A as the (spectral) sum:
A = IA =
[∑
i∈IN
Pi
]
A =
∑
i∈IN
aiPi. (1)
Similarly, if |ψ〉 ∈ HN , ‖ψ‖2 = 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1, is a normalized vector describing the state of the
entity, it can be written as the sum:
|ψ〉 = I|ψ〉 =
[∑
i∈IN
Pi
]
|ψ〉 =
∑
i∈IN
|ai〉〈ai|ψ〉 =
∑
i∈IN
√
xie
iαi |ai〉, (2)
where for the last equality we have written the complex numbers 〈ai|ψ〉 in the polar form 〈ai|ψ〉 =√
xie
iαi . Clearly, being |ψ〉 normalized to 1, the positive real numbers xi must obey:∑
i∈IN
xi = 1. (3)
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When we measure an observable A in a practical experiment (a physicist does so by letting
the microscopic entity interact with a macroscopic measuring apparatus, a psychologist by letting
a human concept interact with a human mind, according to a certain protocol, if concepts are
studied, or by collecting the decision results, if situations lending themselves to human decisions
are studied), we can obtain one of the N eigenvalues ai, i ∈ IN , and if these N eigenvalues are all
different, we say that the spectrum of A is non-degenerate. Consequently, the measurement has
N distinguishable possible outcomes.
In general terms, the measurement of an observable A is a process during which the state of
the entity undergoes an abrupt transition – called “collapse” in the quantum jargon – passing
from the initial state |ψ〉 to a final state which is one of the eigenvectors |ai〉 of A, associated
with the eigenvalue ai, i ∈ IN . The process is non-deterministic, and we can only describe it in
probabilistic terms, by means of a “golden rule” called the Born rule, which states the following:
the probability P (|ψ〉 → |ai〉) for the transition |ψ〉 → |ai〉, is given by the square of the length
of the vector Pi|ψ〉, i.e., the square of the length of the initial vector, once it has been projected
onto the eigenspace of A corresponding to the eigenvalue ai. More explicitly:
P (|ψ〉 → |ai〉) = ‖Pi|ψ〉‖2 = 〈ψ|PiPi|ψ〉
= 〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|ai〉〈ai|ψ〉 = |〈ai|ψ〉|2 = xi, (4)
for all i ∈ IN . And of course, following (3), we have∑
i∈IN
P (|ψ〉 → |ai〉) =
∑
i∈IN
xi = 1. (5)
3 The GTR-model
In this section we present the GTR-model, which is able to describe very general situations of
measurement, characterized by an arbitrary (finite) number of outcomes. To facilitate the un-
derstanding of its logic, we present the model as an idealized mechanical model. This, however,
must not mislead us: the GTR-model is an abstract construct, totally independent of its pos-
sible physical realizations. These very general measurement situations include those associated
with classical, almost deterministic measurements, when the outcomes are fully predictable (if
the state of the entity is known), but also, more generally, those associated with quantum-like
measurements, when the outcomes are most of the times genuinely unpredictable, but nevertheless
characterizable in probabilistic terms.
The construction of the model draws its inspiration from a previous two-outcome model, called
the sphere-model (see Sec. 6), which in turn is a generalization of the so-called -model, originally
designed to study two-state systems, like spin-1
2
quantum entities, and their generalizations (Aerts,
1998, 1999b; Sassoli de Bianchi, 2013; Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014).
The GTR-model has many interesting features. It generalizes the sphere-model, allowing
for the description of measurements having an arbitrary number of outcomes, and it offers a
considerable insight into the internal working of quantum and quantum-like systems, as it allows
for a full visualization of what goes on during a measurement. The paradigm at the basis of
its operation is that of the hidden-measurement approach (Aerts, 1986, 1998, 1999b; Sassoli de
Bianchi, 2013), where the emergence of quantum structures is explained as the consequence of
the presence of fluctuations in the measurement context. In this approach, the indeterminism
inherent in quantum and quantum-like systems is due to the fact that a measurement is made of
different possible pure measurements (almost deterministic interactions), which can be actualized
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in an unpredictable way during the execution of the experiment.
These pure measurements are hidden in the sense that a physicist, when experimenting with
microscopic entities, cannot distinguish them at the macroscopic level. Similarly, in cognitive
experiments, they are hidden because they are actualized at the subconscious level, via “non-
logical” intrapsychic processes, which cannot be discriminated at the conscious level. The great
explanatory power of the GTR-model resides precisely in the fact that these hidden aspects of
a measurement process are made fully manifest, so that one can really “see” what is going on,
during its execution.
Another interesting aspect of the GTR-model is that it can describe all sorts of probabilistic
models, generally non-Kolmogorovian and non-Hilbertian (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014), and
thanks to the very general theoretical framework it provides, it can be exploited to reveal an
even more hidden aspect which is possibly at the basis of quantum probability, and which can
explain its “unreasonable” success in the description of so many kinds of measurement situations,
in different layers of reality. This hidden aspect is the fact that quantum measurements turn out
to be interpretable as processes of randomization not only over deterministic – pure measurement
– interactions, but also, and more generally, over all possible kinds of measurements. In other
terms, as we will demonstrate in the next sections, the GTR-model allows to explain quantum
measurements as universal measurements, i.e., as measurements expressing a much deeper level
of actualization of potential elements of reality.
To explain the functioning of the model, we proceed step by step, describing first the two-
outcome situation (N = 2), then the three-outcomes situation (N = 3), and finally the general
situation, with an arbitrary number of outcomes. As we said in the previous section, we shall
limit our discussion to non-degenerate measurements, and refer to (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi,
2014) for the description of the degenerate situation.3
The N = 2 case, with two outcomes
We consider a material point particle living in a Euclidean space Rn, n ≥ 2. Measurements, which
will be denoted eρ{1}{2}, can only have two outcomes. The procedure to follow to perform e
ρ
{1}{2}
is the following. The experimenter takes a sticky breakable elastic band of the ρ-kind (what this
means will be explained shortly), and stretches it over a 1-dimensional simplex4 S1, generated by
two orthonormal vectors xˆ1 and xˆ2. Once the ρ-elastic band is in place, the particle, by moving
deterministically towards it (along a trajectory that is not important here to specify), sticks to it
at a particular point x = x1xˆ1 + x2xˆ2, x1 + x2 = 1, defining the state of the particle on the elastic
(we represent Euclidean vectors in bold). When this happens, two disjoint regions A1 and A2 can
be distinguished, which are respectively the region bounded by vectors xˆ2 and x, and the region
bounded by vectors x and xˆ1 (see Fig. 1).
Then, after some time, as it is made of a breakable material, the ρ-elastic inevitably breaks,
at some a priori unpredictable point λ. If λ ∈ A1, the band, by contracting, draws the particle
to point xˆ1 (the “collapse process” depicted in Fig. 2), whereas if λ ∈ A2, it draws the particle
to point xˆ2. We can observe that to each breaking point λ, it corresponds a specific interaction
3In Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi (2014) we only describe the degenerate situation in the special case of the UTR-
model, i.e., in the special case where the probability density ρ is uniform. However, the same description holds,
mutatis mutandis, for the non-uniform case.
4A simplex is a generalization of the notion of a triangle. A 1-simplex is a line segment; a 2-simplex is an
equilateral triangle; a 3-simplex is a tetrahedron; a 4-simplex is a pentachoron; and so on.
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Figure 1: A 1-dimensional ρ-elastic structure attached to the two unit vectors xˆ1 and xˆ2, with the two regions
A1 and A2 generated by the presence of the particle in x. The vector λ, here in region A1, indicates the point
at which the elastic breaks.
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
Figure 2: The breaking of the ρ-elastic causes the particle to be drawn to point xˆ1.
between the particle and the elastic band, which deterministically draws the former to its final
state xˆ1, or xˆ2. In other terms, the measurement e
ρ
{1}{2} is formed by a collection of hidden pure
measurements, i.e., potential, almost deterministic measurement interactions, only one of which
is each time selected (actualized), when the elastic breaks. These pure measurements are almost
deterministic because if λ = x, then the interaction remains indeterminate, in the classical sense
of a system in a condition of unstable equilibrium.
To calculate the probabilities of the two possible outcomes, one needs to know what is the
physical mechanism governing the breaking of the elastic structure. It is possible to imagine elastics
that break in an infinite number of different ways, depending on their nature and the manner in
which they were manufactured. In general terms, we can assume that each different elastic band
can be characterized by a probability density ρ : S1 → [0,∞[, describing the probabilities for
the elastic of breaking in the different regions of S1. Accordingly, the probability P (Ai|ρ) for a
ρ-elastic (i.e., an elastic characterized by the probability density ρ) to break in the region Ai,
i = 1, 2, is given by the integral:
P (Ai|ρ) =
∫
Ai
ρ(y)dy, (6)
and of course:
P (S1|ρ) = P (A1|ρ) + P (A2|ρ) =
∫
S1
ρ(y)dy = 1. (7)
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Now, since the particle is drawn to xˆi when the elastic breaks in Ai, the probability P (x→ xˆi|ρ)
for the transition x → xˆi, is precisely the probability P (Ai|ρ) for the elastic to break in Ai, so
that we can write:
P (x→ xˆ1|ρ) =
∫
A1
ρ(y)dy, P (x→ xˆ2|ρ) =
∫
A2
ρ(y)dy. (8)
To obtain more explicit expressions, we observe that y = y1xˆ1 + y2xˆ2, so that the first integral in
(8) can be written as the double integral:
P (x→ xˆ1|ρ) =
∫
A1
ρ(y1, y2)dy1dy2, (9)
and since y1 + y2 = 1, we can introduce the new variables:
z1 =
y1 − y2√
2
, z2 =
y1 + y2√
2
=
1√
2
(10)
y1 =
z1 + z2√
2
=
z1√
2
+
1
2
, y2 =
z2 − z1√
2
= − z1√
2
+
1
2
, (11)
so that the double integral (9) transforms into the single integral:
P (x→ xˆ1|ρ) =
∫ − 1√
2
(1−2x1)
− 1√
2
ρ(z)dz, (12)
where we have defined the one-dimensional probability density: ρ(z) ≡ ρ( z√
2
+ 1
2
,− z√
2
+ 1
2
).
An important special case is that of a uniform probability density ρu, describing an elastic band
made of a perfectly uniform material (so that all its segments have the same chance of breaking).
Since S1 has length ‖xˆ2 − xˆ1‖ =
√
2, ρu(z) =
1√
2
, and (12) becomes:
P (x→ xˆ1|ρu) = 1√
2
∫ − 1√
2
(1−2x1)
− 1√
2
dz = x1. (13)
In other terms, in accordance with the analysis of the UTR-model presented in Aerts & Sassoli de
Bianchi (2014), we obtain a result in agreement with the Born rule (4), i.e., the uniform measure-
ment eρu{1}{2} is isomorphic to the measurement of an observable A in a two-dimensional complex
Hilbert space H2, if we represent the quantum state vector |ψ〉 = √x1eiα1|a1〉+√x2eiα2|a2〉 ∈ H2,
whose components give the probabilities for the transitions |ψ〉 → |a1〉 and |ψ〉 → |a2〉 (once
their square modulus is taken), and to that quantum state vector we associate a real vector
x = x1xˆ1 + x2xˆ2, in the 1-simplex S1, whose components give these same probabilities for the
corresponding transitions x→ xˆ1 and x→ xˆ2 (see Sec. 2).
The N = 3 case, with three outcomes
We consider now the slightly more elaborate situation consisting of three possible outcomes. The
entity is always a material point particle, living in a Euclidean space Rn, n ≥ 3. Different ty-
pologies of (non-trivial) measurements can be carried out in this case. More precisely, we can
distinguish four different typologies of measurements: eρ{1}{2}{3}, e
ρ
{1,2}{3}, e
ρ
{1,3}{2} and e
ρ
{2,3}{1}.
We shall only consider the first one, which corresponds to the situation where all three outcomes
can be distinguished by the experimenter (non-degenerate measurement), and refer the reader to
Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi (2014), for the description of the other degenerate situations, where
not all outcomes can be distinguished.
10
The procedure to follow to perform eρ{1}{2}{3} is the following. The experimenter takes a
sticky breakable elastic membrane of the ρ-kind, and stretches it over a 2-dimensional simplex S2
generated by three orthonormal vectors xˆ1, xˆ2 and xˆ3, attaching it to its three vertex points. Once
the membrane is in place, the particle, by moving deterministically towards it (along a trajectory
that is not important here to specify), sticks to it at a particular point x = x1xˆ1 + x2xˆ2 + x3xˆ3,
with x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, defining the state of the particle on the membrane. When this happens,
three different disjoint convex regions A1, A2 and A3 can be distinguished on the membrane’s
surface, delimited by three “tension lines” which connect x to the vertex points of S2 (see Fig. 3).
 
   
   
   
  
   
   
   
  
Figure 3: A 2-dimensional triangular ρ-membrane attached to the three vertex vectors xˆ1, xˆ2 and xˆ3, with
the three disjoint convex regions A1, A2, and A3, generated by the presence of the particle in x (the “tension
lines” of demarcation between the three regions correspond to the clear dashed lines in the drawing). The
vector λ, here in region A2, indicates the point where the elastic membrane breaks.
Then, after some time the elastic membrane breaks, at some unpredictable point λ (see Fig. 3).
If λ ∈ A2, the tearing will propagate inside the entire region A2, but not in the other two regions
A1 and A3 (due to the presence of the tension lines), causing also its 2 anchor points xˆ1 and xˆ3 to
tear away (from a physical point of view, the “collapse” of the membrane in region A2 should be
understood as a sort of explosive-like reaction of disintegration of its atomic constituents). Once
the membrane is detached from the two above mentioned anchor points, being elastic, it contracts
toward the remaining anchor point xˆ2, drawing in this way the point particle, which is attached
to it, to the same final position (see Fig. 4). Similarly, if λ ∈ A1, the final state of the particle is
xˆ1, and if λ ∈ A3, the final state of the particle is xˆ3.
As for the previous description of the one-dimensional elastic band, we can observe that to
each breaking point λ ∈ S2, it corresponds a specific interaction between the particle and the
elastic membrane, almost deterministically drawing the former to its final state. In other terms,
the measurement eρ{1}{2}{3} is formed by a collection of pure measurements, i.e., potential, almost
deterministic measurement interactions, only one of which is each time actualized when the mem-
brane breaks. Again, if we say that the interactions are almost deterministic, and not purely
deterministic, it is because for those λ which are at the boundaries of two (or three) regions, it is
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Figure 4: The breaking of the ρ-elastic membrane (in grey color) in a eρ{1}{2}{3} measurement proceeds in two
steps: first the membrane collapses, within the boundaries of the convex region containing the initial breaking
point (here A2), then, as soon as it looses the anchor points associated with this region, it shrinks towards the
remaining anchor point, bringing with it the particle (here to position xˆ2).
not predetermined which region will disintegrate. These special λ, however, are of zero measure
in the integrals defining the transition probabilities.
Following the same logic as for the two-outcome case, the transition probability x→ xˆ1, for a
membrane of the ρ-kind, can be written as:
P (x→ xˆ1|ρ) =
∫
A1
ρ(y)dy =
∫
A1
ρ(y1, y2, y3)dy1dy2dy3, (14)
and similarly for transitions x→ xˆ2 and x→ xˆ3. Observing that y1 + y2 + y3 = 1, we introduce
the new integration variables (associated with a new orthonormal basis {zˆ1, zˆ2, zˆ3} in R3):
z1 =
y3−y2√
2
, z2 =
2y1−y2−y3√
6
, z3 =
y1+y2+y3√
3
= 1√
3
(15)
y1 =
√
2
3
z2 +
1
3
, y2 = − 1√6(
√
3z1 + z2) +
1
3
, y3 =
1√
6
(
√
3z1 − z2) + 13 ,
and transform the triple integral (14) into the double integral
P (x→ xˆ1|ρ) =
∫
A1
ρ(z1, z2)dz1dz2, (16)
where we have defined:
ρ(z1, z2) ≡ ρ
(√
2
3
z2 +
1
3
,− 1√
6
(
√
3z1 + z2) +
1
3
, 1√
6
(
√
3z1 − z2) + 13
)
. (17)
Considering that the area of S2 is
√
3
2
, for the special case of a uniform probability density
(associated with a membrane made of a uniform material) we have ρu =
2√
3
, so that the above
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integral becomes:
P (x→ xˆ1|ρu) = 2√
3
∫
A1
dz1dz2. (18)
Being A1 a triangle of base
√
2 and height h =
√
3
2
x1, its area is
√
2h
2
=
√
3
2
x1. Thus, in accordance
with the analysis of the UTR-model in Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi (2014), we obtain a result in
agreement with the Born rule (4), i.e., P (x → xˆ1|ρu) = x1, and similarly for the probabilities of
the other two possible transitions. In other terms, the uniform membrane measurement eρu{1}{2}{3} is
isomorphic to the measurement of an non-degenerate observable A, in a three-dimensional complex
Hilbert space H3, if we represent the quantum state vector |ψ〉 = √x1eiα1|a1〉 + √x2eiα2|a2〉 +√
x3e
iα3|a3〉 ∈ H3, by a vector x = x1xˆ1 + x2xˆ2 + x3xˆ3 ∈ S2, whose components are precisely the
transition probabilities (see Sec. 2).
The general N-outcome case
It is straightforward to generalize the working of the GTR-model to the case of an arbitrary number
N of outcomes (for the degenerate case, see Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi (2014)). The material
point particle then lives in Rn, with n ≥ N , and to perform a (non-degenerate) measurement
eρ{1}···{N}, a (N − 1)-dimensional hypermembrane of the ρ kind is stretched over the hypersurface
SN−1 of a (N − 1)-dimensional simplex generated by N orthonormal vectors xˆ1, . . . , xˆN , and is
attached to its N vertex points. Once the hypermembrane is in place, the particle, by moving
deterministically towards it (along a trajectory that is not important here to specify), sticks to it
at a particular point:
x =
∑
i∈IN
xixˆi,
∑
i∈IN
xi = 1, IN ≡ {1, . . . , N}, (19)
which defines the state of the particle on the hypermembrane.
This gives rise to N “tension lines,” connecting x to the different vertex points xˆ1, . . . , xˆN ,
defining in this way N disjoint regions Ai, the convex closures of {xˆ1, . . . , xˆi−1,x, xˆi+1, . . . , xˆN},
such that SN = ∪i∈INAi. Then, after some time the hypermembrane breaks, at some point
λ =
∑
i∈IN λixˆi,
∑
i∈IN λi = 1. If λ ∈ Ai, for a given i ∈ IN , then Ai collapses, causing its
N − 1 anchor points xˆj, j 6= i, to tear away. So, if λ ∈ Ai, the elastic ρ-hypermembrane contracts
toward point xˆi, that is, toward the only point at which it remained attached, pulling in this way
the particle into that position. In other terms, the process produces the transition x → xˆi. The
probability of such process is:
P (x→ xˆi|ρ) =
∫
Ai
ρ(y)dy =
∫
Ai
ρ(y1, . . . , yN)dy1 . . . dyN , (20)
and exploiting the fact that
∑N
i=1 yi = 1, we can perform a suitable change of variables (i.e., of
basis in RN) to transform the above N -variables integral into a (N − 1)-variables integral:
P (x→ xˆi|ρ) =
∫
Ai
ρ(z)dz =
∫
Ai
ρ(z1, . . . , zN−1)dz1 . . . dzN−1, (21)
where the constant variable is zN =
1√
N
∑N
i=1 yi =
1√
N
. It is not difficult to show that in the
uniform case one obtains, for all i ∈ IN (see the proof in Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi (2014)),
P (x→ xˆi|ρu) = xi, (22)
showing that the measurement eρu{1}···{N} is isomorphic to the measurement of a non-degenerate
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observable (1), in a N -dimensional complex Hilbert space HN , if we represent the quantum state
vector (2) by the vector (19), whose components are precisely the transition probabilities (22).
4 Universal measurements
The GTR-model immediately suggests the possibility of considering a much more general typol-
ogy of measurement, expressing a deeper level of potentiality. Indeed, a measurement eρ{1}···{N}
is a conditional measurement, i.e., a measurements whose outcomes are conditional to the spe-
cific choice made for the probability density ρ. However, it is natural to assume that in many
measurement situations the probability density ρ is not given a priori, but randomly selected
within the infinite ensemble of all possible ρ. The measurements would then be the result of a
two-level process of actualization of potentials, the first level corresponding to the random choice
of a given probability density ρ, and the second level to the selection, from that actualized ρ, of
a deterministic interaction, which finally produces the outcome.
We thus need to modelize a measurement situation which consists in a meta-measurement,
such that the statistics of outcomes are also the result of a process of randomization over different
probability densities ρ. We call these more general measurements universal measurements. Since
they involve an average over the non-denumerable set of N -dimensional integrable generalized
functions ρ, one needs to take care, in their definition, not to be confronted with technical problems
related to the foundations of mathematics and probability theory (see the discussion in Aerts &
Sassoli de Bianchi (2014)). This can be done by adopting the following strategy:
(1) First, one shows that any probability density ρ can be described as the limit of a suitably
chosen sequence of cellular probability densities ρnc , as the number of cells nc tends to infinity, in
the sense that for every initial state x and final state xˆi, i ∈ IN , we can always find a sequence of
cellular ρnc , such that the transition probability P (x→ xˆi|ρnc) tends to P (x→ xˆi|ρ), as nc →∞.
By a cellular probability density we mean a probability density describing a structure made of
a total number nc of regular cells (of whatever shape), which tessellate the hypersurface of the
simplex SN−1. These nc cells can only be of two sorts: such that ρnc is equal to a constant inside
them (the same constant for all cells), or such that ρnc is equal to zero inside them, which in
the physical realization in terms of hypermembranes corresponds, respectively, to the situation of
uniformly breakable cells and unbreakable cells.
(2) Thanks to the fact that a cellular probability density ρnc is only made of a finite number
nc of cells, which can either be of the breakable or unbreakable kind, if we exclude the totally
unbreakable case of a ρnc describing a structure only made of unbreakable cells (the trivial case
ρnc ≡ 0, producing no outcomes in a measurement), we have that, given a nc ∈ N, the total
number of possible ρnc is C
0
nc + C
1
nc + C
2
nc + · · · + Cncnc − 1 = 2nc − 1. Therefore, for each nc, we
can unambiguously define the average probability:
P (x→ xˆi|nc) ≡ 1
2nc − 1
∑
ρnc
P (x→ xˆi|ρnc), (23)
where the sum runs over all the possible 2nc−1 (non-zero) cellular probability densities ρnc , made
of nc cells.
Clearly, P (x→ xˆi|nc) is the probability of transition x→ xˆi, when a cellular hypermembrane
ρnc is chosen at random, in a uniform way. The uniform average (23), being over a finite number
of ρnc , is uniquely defined and doesn’t suffer from possible “Bertrand paradox” ambiguities. Also,
considering point (1) above, i.e., the fact that the ρnc are dense in the space of probability densities
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(in the sense specified above), we are in a position to give the following general definition of a
universal measurement.
Definition (Universal Measurement). A measurement euniv{1}···{N} is said to be a universal
measurement if the probabilities associated with all its N possible transitions x→ xˆi, i ∈ IN , are
the result of a uniform average over all possible measurements eρ{1}···{N}, described by all possible
probability densities ρ, as defined by the infinite-cell limit:
P univ(x→ xˆi) = lim
nc→∞
P (x→ xˆi|nc), (24)
where P (x→ xˆi)|nc) is the average (23).
We can observe that in order to define a uniform randomization over all possible ρ, i.e., a
probability measure over the integrable (generalized) functions ρ, without being confronted with
insurmountable technical problems related to the foundations of mathematics, we have followed
here a strategy which is similar to what is done in the definition of the Wiener measure, which
is a probability law on the space of continuous functions, describing for instance the Brownian
motions. As is well known, the Wiener measure allows to attribute probabilities to continuous-
time random walks, and it succeeds to do so by considering them as the limit of discrete-time
processes. In the analysis of Brownian processes, one starts with the description of particles that
can move only on regular cellular structures (regular lattices), which at each step can jump from
one location to another, according to a given probability law, and then consider the (continuous)
limit where these steps become infinitesimal. In our definition of universal measurements, we
have proceeded in a similar logic, by first considering discretized structures ρnc , and their uniform
average, which is perfectly well defined, taking then in the end the infinite limit nc →∞.
The following theorem establishes the connection between universal measurements and uni-
form measurements:
Theorem (Universal⇔ Uniform). A universal measurement euniv{1}···{N} is probabilistically equiv-
alent to a measurement eρu{1}···{N}, defined in terms of a uniform probability density ρu, in the sense
that for all transitions x→ xˆi, i ∈ IN , we have the equality:
P univ(x→ xˆi) = P (x→ xˆi|ρu). (25)
To prove the theorem, we proceed with the following steps. First, in Sec. 5, we show that one
can always consider limits of cellular ρnc , to approximate the transition probabilities associated
with arbitrary ρ (also including the possibility of Dirac distributions), so that the average (23)
does actually include all possible ρ, as nc →∞, i.e., it is a universal average. Then, in Sec. 6, we
study the average probability over all possible kinds of cellular structures ρnc , for a fixed nc, and
show, by a recurrence method, that for all nc ∈ N and i ∈ IN :
P (x→ xˆi|nc) = 1
2nc − 1
∑
ρnc
P (x→ xˆi|ρnc) = P (x→ xˆi|ρu;nc), (26)
where ρu;nc is the probability density describing a uniformly breakable structure made of nc-cells.
Then, considering that P (x→ xˆi|ρu;nc)→ P (x→ xˆi|ρu), as nc →∞, (26) proves (25).
5 Limits of cellular structures
In this section we show that an arbitrary measurement eρ{1}···{N} can always be probabilistically
described in terms of measurements e
ρnc
{1}···{N}, performed by means of cellular hypermembranes
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ρnc , made of nc elementary cells, in the limit nc →∞. By this we mean that, given a probability
density ρ on a simplex SN−1, we can always find a suitable sequence of cellular hypermembranes
ρnc , such that P (x→ xˆi|ρnc)→ P (x→ xˆi|ρ), as nc →∞, for all i ∈ IN .
The N = 2 case (two outcomes)
We start by proving the result in the case of a one-dimensional probability density (describing, in
the physical realization of the model, a one-dimensional elastic band); we will then show that the
proof straightforwardly generalizes to higher dimensional systems.
Our goal is to show that to each one-dimensional probability density ρ(z), on the line segment
[− 1√
2
, 1√
2
] (corresponding to the 1-simplex S1), it is always possible to find a suitable sequence of
cellular distributions ρnc(z), such that:
lim
nc→∞
[P (x→ xˆi|ρ)− P (x→ xˆi|ρnc)] = 0, (27)
with i = 1, 2. For this, we partition the interval [− 1√
2
, 1√
2
] into nc = m` elementary intervals:
[− 1√
2
,− 1√
2
+
√
2
nc
], [− 1√
2
+
√
2
nc
,− 1√
2
+ 2
√
2
nc
], . . . , [− 1√
2
+ (i − 1)
√
2
nc
,− 1√
2
+ i
√
2
nc
], . . . , [ 1√
2
−
√
2
nc
, 1√
2
].
These elementary intervals (i.e., elementary one-dimensional cells), of length
√
2
nc
, are in turn
contained in m = nc
`
larger intervals, of length
√
2
m
=
√
2`
nc
, which are the following: [− 1√
2
,− 1√
2
+
√
2
m
], [− 1√
2
+
√
2
m
,− 1√
2
+ 2
√
2
m
], . . . , [− 1√
2
+ (i− 1)
√
2
m
,− 1√
2
+ i
√
2
m
], . . . , [ 1√
2
−
√
2
m
, 1√
2
]. In other terms,
denoting
Si ≡
[
− 1√
2
+ (i− 1)
√
2
m
,− 1√
2
+ i
√
2
m
]
, (28)
σi,j ≡
[
− 1√
2
+ (i− 1)
√
2
m
+ (j − 1)
√
2
nc
,− 1√
2
+ (i− 1)
√
2
m
+ j
√
2
nc
]
, (29)
we have: Si =
⋃`
j=1 σi,j,
[
− 1√
2
, 1√
2
]
=
⋃m
i=1 Si =
⋃m
i=1
⋃`
j=1 σi,j.
We assume that x1 is such that − 1√2(1− 2x1) ∈ (− 1√2 + (j− 1)
√
2
m
,− 1√
2
+ j
√
2
m
], for some given
j. This condition can also be expressed as mx1 ∈ (j − 1, j]. Therefore, by definition of the ceiling
function, dmx1e = j, and we can write:
P (x→ xˆ1|ρ) =
∫ − 1√
2
(1−2x1)
− 1√
2
ρ(z)dz =
dmx1e−1∑
i=1
∫
Si
ρ(z)dz + rm(x1|ρ), (30)
where the rest:
rm(x1|ρ) =
∫ − 1√
2
(1−2x1)
− 1√
2
[1−(dmx1e−1) 2m ]
ρ(z)dz (31)
tends to zero as m→∞, considering that
lim
m→∞
dmx1e
m
= x1. (32)
At this point, we introduce the following cellular probability density (nc = m`):
ρm`(z) =
χm`(z)∫ 1√
2
− 1√
2
χm`(z)dz
=
χm`(z)
nbc
√
2
nc
, (33)
describing a cellular elastic band made of nc = m` elementary cells, which can only be of two
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sorts: breakable or unbreakable. Here χm`(z) denotes a step-like function, taking the constant
values 1 (for the breakable cells) or 0 (for the unbreakable cells) inside each interval σi,j, and n
b
c is
the total number of breakable elementary cells of the structure. For a cellular probability density
of this kind, (30) becomes:
P (x→ xˆ1|ρm`) =
∫ − 1√
2
(1−2x1)
− 1√
2
ρm`(z)dz =
dmx1e−1∑
i=1
nb,ic
nbc
+ rm(x1|ρm`), (34)
where nb,ic is the number of breakable cells in Si, and the rest is defined as in (31). Comparing
(30) with (34), we obtain:
P (x→ xˆ1|ρ)− P (x→ xˆ1|ρm`) =
∫ − 1√
2
(1−2x1)
− 1√
2
[ρ(z)− ρm`(z)]dz
=
dmx1e−1∑
i=1
(∫
Si
ρ(z)dz − n
b,i
c
nbc
)
+ [rm(x1|ρ)− rm(x1|ρm`)]. (35)
All we need to do is to observe that we can always choose ρm`(z) in such a way that
nb,ic
nbc
→∫
Si
ρ(z)dz, as ` → ∞, for all i = 1, . . . ,m. This because, for each i, the probability ∫
Si
ρ(z)dz
is a real number in the interval [0, 1], and rational numbers of the form n
b,i
c
nbc
, with 0 ≤ nb,ic ≤ nbc,
nbc > 0, are dense in [0, 1]. Therefore, for such a choice of ρm`(z), taking the limit `→∞, the sum
in (35) vanishes, and taking the limit m → ∞, also the two rests in (35) vanish, so that we can
conclude that (27) holds, i.e., that we can always find a suitable sequence of probability densities
ρnc ≡ ρm`, describing structures made of breakable and unbreakable elementary cells, such that
in the infinite-cell limit nc →∞ they produce exactly the same probabilities as ρ. Of course, the
same reasoning holds true for outcome x2, considering also that P (x→ xˆ2|ρ) = 1−P (x→ xˆ1|ρ).
The general case
It is straightforward to generalize the above result to the case of a (N − 1)-dimensional hyperme-
mbrane describing a system with N different possible outcomes. For this, we observe that it is
always possible to replace in the integral (21) the probability density ρ, defined on SN−1, by an
extended probability density:
ρ˜(z) =
{
ρ(z) if z ∈ SN−1
0 if z ∈ RN−1 \ SN−1, (36)
defined on a (N − 1)-dimensional hyperrectangle RN−1, which we assume is oriented according to
the z-coordinate system, and is large enough to contain the simplex SN−1. In other terms, we can
write:
P (x→ xˆi|ρ) = P (x→ xˆi|ρ˜) =
∫
Ai
ρ˜(z1, . . . , zN−1)dz1 . . . dzN−1, (37)
with the integrand now defined on the entire hyperrectangle RN−1.
Writing RN−1 as the Cartesian product of one dimensional intervals, i.e., RN−1 = I1 ×
I2 · · · IN−2 × IN−1, where Ik = [ak, bk], k = 1, . . . , N − 1, we can partition each one of these
intervals as follows:
Ik =
⋃m
i=1 Si;k =
⋃m
i=1
⋃`
j=1 σi,j;k, Si;k ≡
[
ak + (i− 1) bk−akm , ak + i bk−akm
]
,
σi,j;k ≡
[
ak + (i− 1) bk−akm + (j − 1) bk−akn , ak + (i− 1) bk−akm + j bk−akn
]
,
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with n = m`. In this way, we obtain the tessellation
RN−1 =
m⋃
i1,...,iN−1=1
Si1;1 × · · · × SiN−1;N−1
=
m⋃
i1,...,iN−1=1
⋃`
j1,...,jN−1=1
σi1,j1;1 × · · · × σiN ,jN ;N . (38)
Similarly to what we have done for the one-dimensional case, we can then introduce a cellu-
lar probability density ρ˜nc , taking constant values 1 or 0 on each of the nc = n
N−1 = (m`)N−1
elementary hyperrectangles σi1,j1;1 × · · · × σiN−1,jN−1;N−1, and study the probability difference
P (x → xˆi|ρ˜) − P (x → xˆi|ρ˜nc), i ∈ IN . Here we have to observe that the convex regions
of integration Ai only intersect a finte number of (N − 1)-dimensional hyperrectangular cells
Si1;1× · · · × SiN−1;N−1, so that the indices associated with these “peripheral” cells define, for each
integration variable, the higher and lower values for the summation indices, when the multiple
integral of the probability difference is written as a sum of integrals over these hyperrectangu-
lar cells. This produces a finite number of rests, which tends to zero when m goes to infinity.
We also observe, similarly to the one-dimensional case, that the integrals of ρ˜nc over the cells
Si1;1× · · ·×SiN−1;N−1 are equal to the number of breakable elementary cells they contain, divided
by the number of breakable elementary cells of the entire structure. Therefore, by letting `→∞,
and by suitably choosing ρ˜nc , we can always make sure that these rational numbers tend to the real
numbers corresponding the integrals associated with ρ˜. Observing that ρ ≡ ρ˜ on SN−1, we thus
conclude that (27) holds also in the (N−1)-dimensional case, i.e., when ρ is a (N−1)-dimensional
hypermembrane describing a measurement with N different outcomes.
6 Averaging over cellular structures
In the previous section we have shown that a measurement with an arbitrary ρ (an arbitrary
hypermembrane) can always be understood as the limit of measurements performed by discretized
structures ρnc , having a finite number nc of breakable and unbreakable cells, when the number
of these cells tends to infinity. We want now to determine the probabilities of measurements
describing situations where the cellular structure ρnc is not given a priori, but selected at random
among all possible structures with a given nc. We start considering the one-dimensional case (two
outcomes), then will show that the analysis straightforwardly generalize to an arbitrary number
of dimensions (i.e., of outcomes).
The one-dimensional case
We consider one-dimensional cellular elastic structures. As already mentioned, cells can only be of
two sorts: breakable (b) or unbreakable (u). For simplicity, we also assume that the point particle
can only be located on the elastic in a position corresponding to the contact point between two
cells (in other terms, we exclude the two end points of the elastic, as in any case they correspond
to eigenstates, which are not affected by the measurements).
The simplest non trivial case is when the elastic is made of two cells. Then, the number of
different possible elastic structures, excluding the totally unbreakable one, is 22 − 1 = 3, which
are: (bb) = uniformly breakable, (ub) = right breakable, and (bu) = left breakable. For a two-cell
elastic, in addition to its two end points, which we denote x0 (left end) and x2 (right end), there
is a unique internal point of contact between the two cells (see Fig. 5), which we denote x1. This
is the only point that can be occupied by the particle, and which can give rise to the transition
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x1 → x0, if the right cell breaks, or x1 → x2, if the left cell breaks.
 
x1 x0 x2 
Figure 5: A 2-cell structure in the “left breakable” configuration (bu). The breakable cell is represented in
grey color, the unbreakable one in white color. The material point particle occupies the only available position
between the two cells.
We simply denote P (i→ j|xy) the probability of transition xi → xj, knowing that the elastic
is of the (xy) kind, x, y ∈ {b, u}. For transition 1→ 0 (i.e., x1 → x0), we have:
P (1→ 0|bb) = 1
2
, P (1→ 0|ub) = 1, P (1→ 0|bu) = 0, (39)
whereas for transition 1→ 2 (i.e., x1 → x2) we have:
P (1→ 2|bb) = 1
2
, P (1→ 2|ub) = 0, P (1→ 2|bu) = 1. (40)
We now assume that the elastic is not a priori given, but chosen each time at random, in a
uniform way, i.e., in a way such that all the elastics have exactly the same chance to be selected.
Then, if µ(xy) denotes the probability that elastic (xy) is chosen, we have µ(xy) = 1
3
. If we denote
P (1→ j|2) the probability of transition x1 → xj, when the 2-cell elastic is chosen in a uniformly
random way (excluding from the choice the (uu) fully unbreakable structure), by definition we
have:
P (1→ j|2) =
∑
(xy)
µ(xy)P (1→ j|xy) = 1
3
∑
(xy)
P (i→ j|xy). (41)
For transition 1→ 0, we therefore obtain:
P (1→ 0|2) = 1
3
[P (1→ 0|bb) + P (1→ 0|ub) + P (1→ 0|bu)]
=
1
3
(
1
2
+ 1 + 0
)
=
1
3
3
2
=
1
2
, (42)
and of course we also have P (1 → 2|2) = 1− P (0 → 2|2) = 1
2
. Thus, we find that the transition
probabilities for a randomly chosen breakable elastic, are identical to the transition probabilities
associated with the uniformly breakable elastic:
P (1→ j|2) = P (1→ j|bb), j ∈ {0, 2}. (43)
Having explicitly checked the 2-cell example, we want now to prove that:
P (i→ j|n) = P (i→ j| b · · · b︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
), i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, j ∈ {0, n}, (44)
remains true also in the general n-cell case. The total number of different breakable elastics is
now 2n − 1, and the uniform measure over elastics is µ(x · · ·) = 1
2n−1 . Thus:
P (i→ j|n) = 1
2n − 1
∑
(x···)
P (i→ j|x · · ·), (45)
and what we need to prove is that:∑
(x···)
P (i→ j|x · · ·) = (2n − 1)P (i→ j|b · · · b). (46)
With no loss of generality, we limit our discussion to the case j = 0. Then, since P (i→ 0|b · · · b) =
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n−i
n
, the above equality becomes:∑
(x···)
P (i→ 0|x · · ·) = (2n − 1)n− i
n
, (47)
and for i = 1, we have: ∑
(x···)
P (1→ 0|x · · ·) = (2n − 1)n− 1
n
. (48)
We start by writing:∑
(x···)
P (1→ 0|x · · ·) =
∑
(u···)
P (1→ 0|u · · ·) +
∑
(b···)
P (1→ 0|b · · ·), (49)
where the first sum in the r.h.s. of the equation runs over all n-cell elastics starting with a left
unbreakable cell, and the second sum runs over all n-cell elastics starting with a left breakable cell.
We can observe that all probabilities in the first sum are equal to 1, so that the sum is equal to
2n−1−1. Also, the second sum can be written as ∑n−1k=0 kk+1(n−1k ). Using a symbolic computational
program (like Mathematica, of Wolfram Research, Inc.), one easily obtains the exact identity:
n∑
k=0
k
k + 1
(
n
k
)
=
2n(n− 1) + 1
n+ 1
, (50)
so that: ∑
(x···)
P (1→ 0|x · · ·) = 2n−1 − 1 + 2
n−1(n− 2) + 1
n
= (2n − 1)n− 1
n
, (51)
which proves (48).
To prove (47) for an arbitrary i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, we can reason by recurrence. We have shown
that the equality holds for i = 1; let us assume it holds for some i, and that this implies it also
holds for i+ 1. We write:∑
(x···)
P (i+ 1→ 0|x · · ·)
=
∑
(···u···)
P (i+ 1→ 0| · · ·u · · ·) +
∑
(···b···)
P (i+ 1→ 0| · · · b · · ·), (52)
where the first sum, in the r.h.s. of the equation, runs over all elastics having an unbreakable
(i + 1)-th cell, and the second sum runs over all n-cell elastics having a breakable (i + 1)-th cell.
Observing that P (i+ 1→ 0| · · ·u · · ·) = P (i→ 0| · · ·u · · ·), we can write for the first sum:∑
(···u···)
P (i+ 1→ 0| · · ·u · · ·) =
∑
(···u···)
P (i→ 0| · · ·u · · ·)
=
∑
(···u···)
P (i→ 0| · · ·u · · ·) +
∑
(···b···)
P (i→ 0| · · · b · · ·)−
∑
(···b···)
P (i→ 0| · · · b · · ·)
=
∑
(x···)
P (i→ 0|x · · ·)−
∑
(···b···)
P (i→ 0| · · · b · · ·)
= (2n − 1)n− i
n
−
∑
(···b···)
P (i→ 0| · · · b · · ·), (53)
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where for the equality of the second line we have added and subtracted the same quantity, and
for the last equality we have used (47) and the recurrence hypothesis. Then, (52) becomes:∑
(x···)
P (i+ 1→ 0|x · · ·) = (2n − 1)n− i
n
+
+
∑
(···b···)
[P (i+ 1→ 0| · · · b · · ·)− P (i→ 0| · · · b · · ·)] . (54)
Denoting ki the number of breaking cells at the right of the i-th cell, and k the total number
of breaking cells, for an elastic of the (· · · b · · ·) kind, we have P (i → 0| · · · b · · ·) = ki
k
, and
P (i+ 1→ 0| · · · b · · ·) = ki−1
k
, so that the difference of probabilities in (65) is equal to − 1
k
, and is
independent of ki. Using the exact identity (which again, can be easily obtained using a symbolic
computational program, like Mathematica, of Wolfram Research, Inc.):
n∑
k=0
1
k + 1
(
n
k
)
=
2n+1 − 1
n+ 1
, (55)
we obtain
−
∑
(···b···)
1
k(· · · b · · ·) = −
n−1∑
k=0
1
k + 1
(
n− 1
k
)
= −2
n − 1
n
, (56)
and inserting (56) into (54), we finally obtain:∑
(x···)
P (i+ 1→ 0|x · · ·) = (2n − 1)n− i
n
− 2
n − 1
n
= (2n − 1)n− (i+ 1)
n
,
which proves that (47) also holds for i+ 1, thus completing the recurrence proof.
The multidimensional case
The above demonstration was only for one-dimensional cellular structures, but it is straightforward
to generalize it to the case of an arbitrary number of dimensions. Also in this case, the breakable (b)
and unbreakable (u) regular cells tessellating the hypermembranes, although now multidimensional
(for instance, in two dimensions, they can be triangles, rectangles, or hexagons), they remain finite
in number, so that for a given nc, there is always only a total number 2
nc − 1 of different possible
cellular nc-cell hypermembranes ρnc .
If we consider an arbitrary region A (not necessarily convex) of a given hypermembrane, then
the probability P (A|ρnc) that one of the cells in A breaks is given by the ratio between the number
of breakable cells in A and the total number of breakable cells in the hypermembrane. Of course,
in case ρnc ≡ ρu;nc , i.e., in case the hypermembrane is a uniform structure, made only of breakable
cells, P (A|ρu;nc) is simply the ratio between the number of cells in A and the number nc of cells
forming the entire hypermembrane. So, if we denote by i the number of cells contained in the
complementary region of A, then nc − i is the number of cells contained in A, and we can write:
P (A|ρu;nc) =
nc − i
nc
. (57)
What we need to show is that the probability
P (A|nc) = 1
2nc − 1
∑
ρnc
P (A|ρnc), (58)
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that a cell in region A breaks, when a nc-cell breakable membrane is chosen at random, in a
uniform way, is equal to P (A|ρu;nc). For this, all we have to do is to reorganize the nc cells
forming the hypermembrane on a line, in the following way: we choose a method to enumerate
the i cells contained in the complementary region of A, place them in order on the left side of
a line, then, to follow, we do the same with the remaining nc − i cells contained in A, placing
them on the right side (see Fig. 6, for a two-dimensional example). In this way, we transform the
 1 3 2 4 
5 7 6 8 
12 27 26 28 
13 29 14 30 
15 31 16 32 
17 18 19 20 
9 21 10 22 
11 24 23 25 A 
Figure 6: An enumerated two dimensional structure (here for simplicity represented as a rectangle) made of
nc = 32 cells, with a sub-region A made of nc − i = 12 cells, and its complementary region made of i = 20
cells. Breakable cells are represented in grey color, unbreakable ones in white color.
multidimensional ρnc-hypermembrane, made of nc cells, into an effective 1-dimensional one, made
of a same number of cells, and according to (47) we have:
P (A|nc) = 1
2nc − 1
∑
(x···)
P (i→ 0|x · · ·) = nc − i
nc
. (59)
7 Robustness
In Sec. 4 we have proved a theorem establishing the (probabilistic) equivalence between univer-
sal measurements and uniform measurements, and in the previous section we have shown that
universal measurements do correspond to an average over measurements describing very different
probabilistic models, not necessarily amenable to the Kolmogorovian or Hilbert ones. Also, as em-
phasized in Sec. 3, and in the first part of this article (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014), uniform
measurements, and therefore also universal measurements, are equivalent to quantum measure-
ments, whenever the structure of the set of states is Hilbertian. In this section, we investigate
another remarkable characteristic of universal measurements: their statistical robustness.
In Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi (2014), we have explained that universal/uniform measurements
can be interpreted as processes lying in between the pure discovery, classical regime, and the pure
creation, solipsistic5 regime. Another way of characterizing them, is to say that they correspond to
a balance between two different kinds of randomness, which are fused together in an experiment.
The first one is associated with the lack of knowledge of the experimenter about the nature of the
experiment which is actually performed, at each measure (the choice of a specific ρ-hypermembrane
in the GTR-model), and the second one is associated with the experiment itself, i.e., with the
5In Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi (2014), we have used the term ‘solipsistic’ to denote measurements whose
unpredictable outcomes are in no way affected by a change of the state of the measured entity.
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inherent randomness in the process of actualization of a specific deterministic interaction (the λ
variable in the GTR-model).
Interestingly, the difference between these two levels of randomness, or of lack of knowledge,
which are distinguishable in theoretical terms, but fused together, and therefore undistinguishable,
in practical terms, within the statistics of outcomes of a measurement, is also mentioned in our
ordinary language in the distinction between the term random and the term arbitrary. In some
languages, the literal meaning of random is “that which falls towards you” (as for instance a
danger, a risk, like when dice are rolled and you may loose a bet). For example in Dutch it is the
word ‘toevallig’, from ‘fallen’, which means ‘to fall’, and ‘toe’, which means ‘towards you’. The
same root of meaning is strongly present in the French word ‘hazard’, which indeed means ‘danger,
risk’, and the English ‘hazard’. And arbitrary, (arbitraire, in French, willekeurig, in Dutch) is “that
which is guided by your will” (as for instance when you take a decision, for example to perform an
experiment, in a given moment). Hence our ancestors, in the era when language developed, were
aware of the difference between the randomness provoked by themselves, as subjects, expressed in
the word ‘arbitrary’, and the randomness coming from the objects of their experience, expressed
in the word ‘hazard’. By means of the specific notion of universal measurement, this distinction
can be expressed in precise mathematical terms, as the difference between the randomness coming
from the level of the choice of the measurement (the selection of a ρ), and the randomness coming
from the level of execution of the measurement (the selection of a λ).
This remark allows us to introduce the next analysis we want to present in this article. Al-
though an experimenter has clearly no absolute means to control the amount of randomness which
is inherent in a measurement, once it has been selected, s/he may nevertheless have the possibility
to exert some control over the available measurements, that is, over the probability densities ρ
which can be selected, every time a measurement is performed. In a cognitive experiment with
human subjects, such a control might consist of only selecting subjects with certain characteristics
as participants in the experiment, e.g. individuals with a particular affinity or lack of affinity with
certain fields of human experience, belonging to certain schools of thought, having or not having
a specific culture, etc.
To account in a simple way for this ability of the experimenter to vary her/his level of control
over a (universal) measurement, in the general case ofN possible outcomes, we introduce a “control
region” C of SN−1, of Lebesgue measure µL(C) = (1 − )
√
N
(N−1)! ,  ∈ [0, 1], such that the only
allowed probability densities are those of the truncated form:
ρ(z) =
1
1− ∫
C
ρ(z)dz
{
ρ(z) if z ∈ SN−1 \ C
0 if z ∈ C. (60)
In the physical realization of the GTR-model, one can imagine that the experimenter can apply
a special substance on the hypersurface corresponding to region C, so that the hypermembranes
will become unbreakable in that region, and all hidden deterministic interactions associated with
the λ belonging to C will become unavailable (i.e., it will not be possible to actualize them during
a measurement).
If we consider ρ of this “controlled” kind, the average (26) becomes:
P (x→ xˆi|nc; ) = 1
2nc − 1
∑
ρnc
P (x→ xˆi)|ρnc) = P (x→ xˆi)|ρu;nc), (61)
where the sum runs over all possible cellular probability densities ρu;nc that are identically zero in
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C. Thus:
P univ(x→ xˆi|) ≡ lim
nc→∞
P (x→ xˆi|nc; )
= lim
nc→∞
P (x→ xˆi)|ρu;nc) = P (x→ xˆi|ρu), (62)
where
ρu(z) =
1

{
1√
N
(N−1)!
if z ∈ SN−1 \ C
0 if z ∈ C (63)
is the truncated uniform probability density, describing an elastic structure uniformly breakable
in SN−1 \ C, and uniformly unbreakable in C. Therefore, we have:
P univ(x→ xˆi|) =
∫
Ai
ρu(z)dz =
1

√
N
(N−1)!
∫
Ai
χ(z)dz, (64)
where χ(z) is the characteristic function of SN \ C.
To study the robustness of the -universal measurement, we consider a state x′ = x + δx, very
close to x, and want to compare the transition probabilities of these two states:
|P univ(x′ → xˆi|)− P univ(x→ xˆi|)| = 1

√
N
(N−1)!
∣∣∣∣(∫
A′i
−
∫
Ai
)
χ(z)dz
∣∣∣∣ , (65)
where A′i is the convex region associated with state x′. As we said, we assume that the experi-
menter is able to vary its level of control over the measurement, by varying the parameter , i.e.,
by varying the size of the unbreakable region C. We also assume that, by adjusting the control
parameter , the experimenter tries to maximize the robustness of the measurement, that is, to
minimize the variation of the probabilities with respect to a small variation δx of the state.
A way to do this is to let  → 0. Depending on how C → SN−1, this will give rise to
either classical (almost) deterministic processes, or to solipsistic-like processes. For instance, if
C = SN−1 \ B(λ), with B(λ) a (N − 1)-ball of volume 
√
N
(N−1)! contained in SN−1, centered
in λ, then ρ(y) → δ(y − λ), as  → 0, which corresponds to a purely deterministic process.
Probabilities will then either be 0 or 1, and will typically remain constant when the state x is
slightly varied (the only possible variations being of course when x crosses the boundaries of the
region Ai containing λ, causing the probabilities to abruptly shift from 0 to 1, or vice versa,
passing through a point of unstable equilibrium).
Similarly, considering a more general situation where, say, C = SN−1 \ ∪ni=1B(λi), with the
B(λi) that are now balls of volume

n
√
N
(N−1)! , we have in this case ρ
(y) → 1
n
∑n
i=1 δ(y − λi),
as  → 0, which corresponds to a mixed condition describing, for certain states, a deterministic
process, and for others a solipsistic one. But also in this case probabilities will remain constant,
for small variations of almost all states x.
So, we can say that the regime  → 0 exhibits robustness in a trivial way, considering that
probabilities become constant in this limit. There is however a more interesting regime, exhibiting
robustness in a non trivial way. Indeed, observing that the parameter  is at the denominator of
the fraction in (65), it is clear that if we increase , the ratio will decrease. Regarding the second
factor in (65), considering that the Lebesgue measure of C tends to 0 as  tends to 1, it is natural
to assume that there exist a ˜ < 1 such that, for  ≥ ˜, a same portion of C will be contained in
A′i and Ai. Accordingly, the difference of the two integrals in (65) will become independent of ,
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for  ≥ ˜, and be equal to µL(A′i)− µL(Ai), so that for  ≥ ˜, we obtain:
|P univ(x′ → xˆi|)− P univ(x→ xˆi|)| = 1

|x′i − xi| = 1

|δxi|, (66)
and clearly the most robust condition (i.e., the smoothest possible variation of the probabilities)
is obtained by letting → 1.
In other terms, in accordance with the recent analysis of De Raedt et al. (2013), we find that
universal measurements, like quantum measurements, correspond to measurements for which the
frequencies of the observed outcomes are maximally robust with respect to small variations of
the state of the system, i.e., with respect to small variations in the conditions under which the
measurements are carried out. This allows us to further characterize universal measurements as
measurements in which the experimenter exerts the least possible control, letting all the random-
ness naturally present in the experimental context freely manifest; or, to put it in an equivalent
way, they correspond to measurements dealing with that “immanent” randomness which remains
after all forms of control have been subtracted, i.e., all attempts to decrease randomness have
been subtracted, by whatever means.
This is typically what happens when dealing with microscopic entities, since we are not usually
in a position to control what happens at the level of the hidden interactions, when performing
measurements on these entities, and therefore reduce the randomness contained in them. Of
course, this doesn’t mean that such randomness will necessarily always be an unavoidable ingredi-
ent of every quantum measurement. Indeed, one can think that, by means of more sophisticated
experimental protocols, it may become possible in the future to push away at least part of it. Just
to give an example, so-called minimally-disturbing implementations of von-Neumann measure-
ments, using the formalism of positive operator valued measures (Barnum, 2002), could constitute
a possibility in that direction.
Of course, the same holds true in measurements with human subjects. Indeed, it is in principle
always possible to exploit a deeper understanding of the working of the human mind to design
protocols where the questions addressed to the subjects become less interrogative, and more
determinative. Mind control techniques used to favor certain reactions from a person, for instance
in the ambit of selling, precisely do that. Think how an experienced seller can monitor the
customer’s face and manner, in real time, so as to find the exact moment to place a certain
suggestion, to have a higher probability of producing a certain response.
It is important however to emphasize that when an experimenter increases her/his level of
control in a certain experiment, be it a psychological experiment or a physical one, in a way or
another s/he will have to alter the experimental protocol. And by doing so, s/he may end up
affecting the nature of the observed properties, as properties are operational quantities, that is,
quantities defined by means of specific operations specifying how they have to be tested (i.e.,
observed), and if we change these operations (for instance to reduce randomness) we may end up
changing the very (operational) definition of the properties under observation (for a discussion of
this point, see Sassoli de Bianchi (2014)).
In addition to that, when we try to acquire more control, the risk is to also obtain measurements
containing lesser information about the state of the measured entity in comparison to that of the
state of the measuring system. Indeed, as shown in the Bayesian-like analysis of S. Aerts (2006),
pure quantum measurements can also be characterized as experiments in which the observer (i.e.,
the measuring system) actively attempts to minimize her/his influence on the produced outcomes.
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This of course is fully compatible with our characterization of quantum measurements as universal
measurements, in which the observer is precisely in a condition of maximal lack of knowledge about
the measurement taking place. Indeed, maximal lack of knowledge also means maximal lack of
control, and maximal lack of control means minimal influence over the observed entity.
8 Conclusion
To conclude, in this second part of the article we have continued our analysis of the GTR-model,
emphasizing its broad structural versatility in the description of measurements which are not
necessarily characterized by a Hilbertian probability model. We have then used the model to
rigorously prove the equivalence between universal measurements and measurements characterized
by uniform probability densities ρu (the UTR-model), which in turn are compatible with the
predictions of the Born rule, whenever the states of the entity under investigation comes from a
Hilbert space.
To define the universal average characterizing universal measurements, we have followed the
traditional way of dealing with high levels of randomness present in nature, like in the analysis
of Brownian motions, considering first a discretization of the problem. More precisely, by ap-
proximating general ρ-hypermembranes as limit of finite cellular structures, we have succeeded
in defining in a mathematically precise and physically transparent way the fundamental notion
of universal measurement, describing situations where the lack of knowledge is double, i.e., not
only about the specific (almost deterministic) hidden interactions which are actualized during an
experiment, but also about how such interactions are each time selected.
As an additional element of characterization of universal measurements, we have also modelized
the situation in which an experimenter decides to take some active control over the randomness
present in a given measurement context, by making certain hidden interactions unavailable. This
active control (which corresponds to an acquisition of knowledge) produces experiments whose
statistics are less robust with respect to small variations of the initial conditions, which explains
why experimenters will have the tendency to increase the universality of their measurements, i.e.,
to increase the reach of the averages that are possibly subtended by their measurements. This
means that a condition of lowest possible control, i.e., lowest possible knowledge regarding the
nature of the measurement which is each time conducted, is the most favorable one in terms of
the reproducibility of the obtained statistics of outcomes.
We conclude by observing that the notion of universal measurement opens to different possi-
bilities regarding the way we should interpret and collect data in future cognitive studies, and it
is the plan of the present authors to elaborate further this notion, both theoretically and exper-
imentally, with the aim of increasing further our understanding of the fundamental probabilistic
structure underlying human cognition and decision.
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